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ABSTRACT
Two of Judaism's greatest philosophers were Philo of Alexandria (c. 
20BCE-50CE) and Saadia ben Joseph (882-942). As the f ir s t ,  who in ­
fluenced the development of C hristian dogma, is the only Jewish 
Hellenistic philosopher from whom a body of work has surv ived , and the 
second can be considered the fa ther of medieval Jewish philosophy, a 
comparison is of import.
The discussion of philosophic concepts includes those of God, His a t t r i­
butes and the idea of a personal God; the Logos; the creation ex nihilo 
o r ex nih ilo n ih il f i t ;  the dua lity  of man; modes of knowledge; revela­
tion ; prophecy; aliegorization and anthropomorphization; fre e -w ill; re ­
ward and punishment; and im m ortality.
I t  Is shown th a t despite certain agreements because o f th e ir  common 
Jewish background, the two moved in to ta lly  d iffe re n t inte llectual 
spheres. Philo was the f i r s t  to attempt to  unite human knowledge and 
d iv ine  revelation. Saadia was equally im portant in his being the f ir s t  
medieval Jewish philosopher to endeavour to  reconcile the Bible and 
philosophy, revelation and reason.
1. INTRODUCTION
Two of Judaism's greatest philosophers were Philo of A lexandria, also 
known as Philo Judaeus, and Saadia ben Joseph, o r Saadia Gaon. A l­
though th e ir  philosophic standpoints have much in common, there  are 
d iffe rences, too, tha t make a comparison of import.
In o rder to pu t them in th e ir  h is to ric  context, it  must be mentioned that 
Philo of Alexandria (c. 20BCE-50CE), a proponent of Hellenistic Greek
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philosophy, "is the only Jewish Hellenistic philosopher from whom a body 
of works has su rv ived" (Katz, 1975:10). Furtherm ore, he "g rea tly  in ­
fluenced the development of C hristian dogma" (Margolis & Marx, 1980:186; 
cf. Marcus, 1948:29), w ith Eusebius, Jerome, Justin M arty r, Clement of 
Alexandria and Ambrosius all being indebted to him (c f. B illings, 
1979:1-3). In addition, "h is general method of exegesis, many of its 
details, the determ ining princip les of his religious philosophy, passed into 
the C hristian Church . . . "  (Drummond, 1969:2). On the other hand, 
Saadia Gaon (882-942) can "be considered the fa the r of medieval Jewish 
philosophy of re lig ion" (Guttmann, 1973:69). Guttman (1973:69) points 
out tha t Saadia was the f ir s t  to develop the ideas of Islamic theology and 
philosophy independently, and was also the prime pioneer in undertaking 
a systematic philosophical jus tifica tion  of Judaism.
Philo's w ritings  deal mainly w ith the Pentateuch and can be divided into 
three series of treatises (c f. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:410-411). 
The f ir s t  consists of an exposition of the Pentateuch as a legal code, 
whereas the second is a philosophical in te rp re ta tion  of the Pentateuch, 
and the th ird  consists of questions and answers on Genesis and Exodus, 
being in the form of a Hellenistic commentary w ith each paragraph headed 
by an exegetic question and answered by a short lite ra l and a long 
allegorical explanation. Saadia's philosophic system as a whole is found 
in his Sefer ha-Emunot ve-ha-De'ot (The book o f beliefs and opinions) 
o rig in a lly  w ritten  in A rab ic; th is  is the earliest Jewish philosophic work 
from medieval times to have surv ived in tact (c f. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 
1971: X IV : 548).
Like all w rite rs , ne ither philosopher was en tire ly  o rig ina l, bu t was in ­
fluenced by others.
2. INFLUENCES
Although the various influences on these two philosophers w ill be pointed 
out throughout th is  paper, it  is appropria te to mention the most important 
ones at th is  stage.
Even though Philo is regarded by some scholars as an opponent of the 
stoics, the philosophical subs truc tu re  of his world view may be described
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as "a stoicism w ith a strong Platonic bent and some neo-Pythagorean in* 
fluences" (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:411). Until the middle of the 
sixteenth cen tu ry , the Church Fathers thought of Philo as a Greek ph i­
losopher and "b y  the time of Herome, it  had become a fixed trad ition  to 
regard Philo as a Platonist" (B illings , 1979:2). In pa rticu la r, the Platonic 
influences can be seen in his separation of the world in to a lower, ma­
te ria l, and a h igher, sp iritua l o r in te llig ib le , realm. Dillon (in  Winston 
& D illon, 1983:77) stresses tha t "Philo of A lexandria is dependent to at 
least some extent on Greek rather than trad itiona l Jewish models fo r  the 
specific form of his allegorical exegesis of the Pentateuch." To underline 
th is influence, Runia (1983:19) contends that
Philo's debt to Plato is greater than to any o ther Greek philoso­
pher, bu t to a large extent his understanding of Plato's philosophy, 
it  is now argued, is filte re d  through the scholastic trad itions of 
Middle Platonism.
However, one must remember tha t as a Jew, Philo "never wavered in his 
loya lty" to "the dominating presence of the Mosaic legislation" (Runia,
1983:2).
Like Philo, Saadia was influenced by the stoics, Plato, neo-Platonists and 
also A ris to tle , bu t fo r his fundamental theses he was dependent on the 
Kalam, inc lin ing  towards its rationalist M u'tazilite  school which was similar 
to the Jewish position with regard to its  belief in the concept of God’s 
u n ity  and in its following the doctrine of free w ill. However, as Guttmann 
(1973:70) maintains,
he denied the atomism of the Kalam and substitu ted Aristote lian 
views on natural science; in his psychology he combined Platonic 
and Aristote lian elements. Even where he agreed in p rinc ip le  w ith 
the tenents of Kalam, he frequen tly  developed these notions in an 
independent fashion.
According to Cahn (1962:329), the greatest influence on Saadia was the 
Arab philosopher Ibn al Rashid whose ideas Saadia incorporated into 
Jewish ideology, bu t w ith the prime aim of s trengthen ing Jewish fa ith .
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With th is  as background, the various philosophic concepts of Philo and 
Saadia w ill be discussed.
3. PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPTS
3.1 God
The influence of the trad itiona l Jewish idea of God can be found in Philo's 
stressing of God's transcendence and s p ir itu a lity . In rejecting stoic 
materialism and pantheism, he denies the concept of a personal God, albeit 
not consistently. He rejects anthropomorphic characteristics in discuss­
ing God, elevating him "above all values and perfections conceivable to 
the human mind" (Guttmann, 1973:27). He contends tha t it is wrong 
to suppose that God feels any passion, as "d isqu ie t is peculiar to human 
weakness" and has no relation to God.
A ll the same the Lawgiver uses such expressions, jus t so fa r as 
they serve fo r a kind of elementary lesson, to admonish those who 
could not otherwise be brought to th e ir  senses. (Philo, 
1968:111:37).
As only His bare existence can be comprehended by the in te llect, Philo 
pre fers to call God "He Who Is" o r even "B e ing". This transcendentalism 
surpasses even that of Plato, w ith God transcending v ir tu e , knowledge, 
the good and the beautifu l:
God being uncreated and the A uthor of the creation of the others 
needs none of the properties which belong to the creatures which 
He has brought in to being (Philo, 1968:111:39).
With regard to p rov ing  the existence of God, Philo adopts Plato's causal 
approach that fo r the world to exist something must have brought it in to 
being. Blau (1971:53) refers to Philo's c itin g  of Isaiah 66:1 in which the 
prophet reports God's saying, "The heaven is my throne and the earth 
is my foo tstoo l." As both these objects must have a cause, God must 
be that and also d is tinc t from the heavens and earth . However, if ev­
e ry th ing  had a cause, then something must have caused God, too, and 
one is faced w ith an In fin ite  Regress.
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Philo tries to overcome th is  w ith the Aristote lian argument of the original 
agent, or Unmoved Mover being God. He also adopts the argument from 
design: as so much o rder exists in the world (such as the seasons), 
there must be one who established the o rder, ju s t as if  one sees a house, 
one must realise there is an a rtif ic e r behind it :  "We see then, that any 
piece of work always involves the knowledge of a workman" (Philo, 
1968:V I1 :117). Blau (1971:54-55) mentions another argument tha t Philo 
uses - tha t of in trospection: we can comprehend tha t a mind is in our 
body, even if  d is tinc t and separate.
S im ilarly, the Universal Mind which is in the universe is God. But, as 
Blau (1971:55) says, "God is always outside the world, although His 
powers are exerted in the w o rld ." A lthough all these "p roofs" are d if ­
fe ren t in detail, they are of the same order as all depend upon reasoning 
by analogy or from an effect to its cause. A fina l, and d iffe re n t o rder 
of proof tha t Philo refers to is tha t based on immediate in tu ition  o r d irec t 
knowledge: revelation o r prophetic insp ira tion - even though one must 
remember tha t the essence of God is fo reve r unknowable.
Like Philo, Saadia regards God as omniscient and omnipotent, and his 
concept of the nature of God is based on his view of God as creator. 
He considers tha t the existence of the one God as Creator is a certa in ty  
of reason jus t as much as it  is a doctrine of revelation. Guttmann 
(1973:74) maintains tha t "Saadia's proof follows the usual arguments of 
the Kalam, which show that the world must have had a beginning in time, 
and there fore presupposes a C rea to r." Following Philo's line of reason­
ing, Saadia considers the causal proof of God's existence in holding tha t 
He is the cause of all corporeal existence. Furtherm ore, He is 
incorporeal, fo r if He were not, something beyond Him would have had 
to be the cause of His existence:
. . .  since the Creator of all bodies cannot be of the same species 
as His creatures, and since the bodies are many in number, it 
follows of necessity tha t He be one. For if  He were more than one, 
there would apply to Him the category of number and He would fall 
under the laws govern ing bodies (Saadia, 1948:96).
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Saadia a ttribu tes  three essential qualities to God: life , power and w is­
dom, to which un ity  and uniqueness should also be added, according to 
Guttmann (1973:77). This does not imply a p lu ra lity  in God as these 
qualities are united in Him; however, because of the shortcomings of 
language, we have to speak of them as separate.
Therefore, God's a ttribu tes are identical w ith his essence, a notion that 
follows the M u'tazilite  doctrine of God (c f. Guttmann, 1973:78). As a 
resu lt of th is concept, Saadia believes tha t there is on ly one force in 
th is world, consisting of positive factors such as ligh t and goodness. 
Negative elements, such as darkness and ev il, are not forces as such 
bu t merely are symptomatic of the lack of ligh t o r goodness. Therefore, 
"e v il is only the lack of good o r indiscrim inate use thereof" (Calm, 
1962:331).
Unlike Philo, Saadia prayed to a personal God, while philosophizing about 
the God who is pure being. S ilver (1974:350-351) summarizes Saadia’s 
belief as follows:
The God of action, who is in tension w ith h is to ry  and man, somehow 
blends into a d iv ine inte lligence, who does not rush to man's side 
but has man come to Him through awareness and understanding. 
Saadia (s ic) seems not to have been troub led by any sense of in ­
consistency; indeed, he was supremely confident of his intellectual 
powers. God is se lf-su ffic ie n t. God's se lf-su ffic iency  proves tha t 
all God does is good, hence wise. God acts in h is to ry , listens to 
prayers, and performs miracles.
Philo, on the o ther hand, attempts to overcome any possible con tra ­
dictions on th is  level by his doctrine of the Logos.
3.2 Logos
The attempt to establish God's relation to the world and to bridge the 
gap between Him and m aterial, resulted in Philo's doctrine  of intermediate 
beings, and pa rticu la rly  tha t of the Logos.
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The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His highest and 
chiefest powers are two, even goodness and sovereignty. Through 
His goodness He begat all tha t is, through His sovereignty He rules 
what He has begotten. And in the midst between the two there 
is a th ird  which unites them. Reason (the Logos), fo r it  is through 
reason tha t God is both ru le r and good (Philo, 1968:11:21).
Because, according to Philo, God is transcendent and apart from the 
world , an interm ediary power is required. Such is the Logos which 
"comes to be distinguished from God Himself, w ithout being ontologically 
disconnected from Him" (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:413).
Evidently the Logos is identified w ith the mind of God at times, is 
sometimes symbolized by the high p ries t and at other times is seen as 
being midway between man and God.
Guttman (1973:28) finds tha t Philo's concept of d ivine powers combines 
the Platonic doctrine of ideas, the Stoic logoi spermatikoi which permeate 
the cosmos, and Jewish angelogy (c f. also B réhier, 1950:84-90). The 
Logos corresponds to all three in being the un ity  of ideas, the simple 
source of cosmic power and the highest of the angels. Guttman (1973:28) 
adds:
This combination of Stoic, Platonic, and Jewish notions has resulted 
in a complicated m ixture riddled w ith contradictions. These con­
trad ic tions concern the relationship of these intermediate beings 
to God. Sometimes they are thought of as powers inherent in God 
and sometimes as effects proceeding from him and th e ir  mutual re ­
lations to each other; lastly , it  is hard to decide whether they 
are personal o r impersonal beings.
Therefore, what one sees as God's a c tiv ity  is really the a c tiv ity  of the 
Logos (c f. S ilver, 1974:213).
The problem w ith all of th is is that the Logos appears at times to be a 
second god. Moreover, if the Logos acts at God's command, then God 
must have some influence over it ;  the re fore , God, the transcendent 
power, does s till act in his commanding. And if God cannot contro l the
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Logos, then He is hard ly  omnipotent. I t  appears, therefore, tha t the 
Logos adds as much confusion as c la rifica tion  to Philo’s attempt to es­
tab lish God's relation to the world . In addition, it  seems that Philo be­
lieves tha t i t  was not necessarily God bu t the Logos tha t created the 
world.
3.3 Creation
A philosopher's theory of creation is inextricab ly  in tertw ined w ith his 
doctrine of God. The question here is whether the two philosophers 
being examined consider whether the world was created ex n ih ilo or ex 
n ih ilo  n ih il f i t  (from  formless m atter). Philo is carefu l to remove the 
genesis of the world beyond the confines of time (c f. Drummond, 
1969:1:292) and states that it was created out of p re -ex is ten t matter.
Time began e ither simultaneously w ith the world o r a fte r it .  For 
since time is a measured space determined by the world's movement, 
and since movement could not be p r io r  to the object moving, but 
must of necessity arise e ither a fte r it  or simultaneously w ith it ,  it  
follows of necessity that time also is e ithe r coeval w ith o r la ter born 
than the world (Philo, 1971:1:21).
However, Winston (1981:7) points out a degree of confusion here as " i t  
is exceedingly unclear whether tha t m atter was itse lf, in Philo's view, a
product of God's creative ac t."
In contrast w ith Philo, Saadia considers tha t the world was created ex 
n ih ilo in time. He propounds his view in the follow ing way:
I found tha t it is wrong to assume tha t th ings were created from 
something already exis tent. Such a view is se lf-con trad ic to ry , 
because the term creation implies tha t the substance of the thing 
is created and has a beginning in time, w h ils t the qua lify ing  
statement, "From something" implies tha t its substance was eternal, 
uncreated and w ithout beginning in time. I f  we assume that things 
were created ex n ih ilo , there is no se lf-contrad iction (Three Jewish 
Philosophers, 1969:59-60).
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Saadia presents fou r proofs fo r creation, the f ir s t  founded on Aristote lian 
premises and the other three taken from the Kalam (c f. Encyclopaedia 
Judaica, 1971:X IV : 550). He f ir s t  concludes that the force preserving 
the world is f in ite  and as a resu lt the world itse lf must be fin ite , that 
is have a beginning and an end. Secondly, he argues tha t as anything 
tha t consists of two o r more elements must have been put together in 
time, the world must have been created at some point in time. The th ird  
proof considers tha t as the world is made up of various substances all 
of which are the bearers of accidents w h ich ‘orig inate in time, the world 
itse lf must have originated in time. Fourth ly , if the world were uncre­
ated, time would be in fin ite , and in fin ite  time could not be traversed; 
as a result the present moment could not have a rrived , and a s .it c learly 
exists, time cannot be in fin ite  and, thus, the world must have had a 
beginning (c f. Saadia, 1948:40-46).
It is clear, therefore, tha t the two philosophers disagree strong ly on the 
point of creation. However, they have more in common when i t  comes 
to the consideration of the nature of man. 3.4 Man
Philo regards man as a dua lity , being composed of body and soul, the 
former connecting him w ith matter and the la tte r w ith God. The mind, 
which is "the  s ight of the soul" is the dominant element.
This branch of the soul was not formed of the same elements, out 
of which the o ther branches were brought to completion, bu t it  
was allotted something be tte r and p u re r, the substance in fact out 
of which d iv ine  natures were w rought. And there fore it  is rea­
sonably held tha t the mind alone in all tha t makes us what we are 
is indestructib le  (Philo, 1986:111:33).
Man must make a fundamental choice concerning the direction of his life . 
The a lte rna tive , according to the Encyclopaedia Judaica. (1971:X I I I :413),
is iden tified by Philo w ith the strugg le  of the stoic sage fo r the 
contro l of his passions by reason, and so the whole of stoic ethics 
becomes in tegrated in to Philo's religious philosophy.
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Being placed by nature halfway between the remote de ity , the essence 
and fountain of pure in te llect, and the material substance which is the 
domain of s in fu l passions, man's task is to abandon his lower existence 
and to rise to God (c f. Lewy in Three Jewish philosophers, 1969:18). 
This does not mean tha t Philo recommends f lig h t from the world ; he ra ther 
looks upon the practical life  as the pre requ is ite  fo r the contemplative one, 
even if  the sp iritua l alone has genuine value. He holds tha t man's life  
can reach fu lfilm ent only in the life  of the s p ir it  as the material is subject 
to change and decay.
It is, then, of supreme importance that men should be made aware 
of the permanent rea lity  of which the world is bu t a d is to rted  re ­
flex ion . This true  rea lity  is the mind o r w ill which is beyond all 
existence as its cause and p rinc ip le , the liv in g , self-conscious 
Being who has made this universe and who now governs and guides 
it  (B illin g s , 1979:13).
As a resu lt of th is  concept, he maintains that there is a stage beyond 
science and philosophy which is the highest achievement of the mind: 
wisdom.
For wisdom is a s tra igh t high road, and it  is when the mind's 
course is guided along that road tha t it  reaches the goal which is 
the recognition of knowledge of God. Every comrade of the flesh 
hates and rejects th is  path and seeks to co rru p t it .  For there are 
no two th ings so u tte r ly  opposed as knowledge and pleasure of the 
flesh (Philo, 1968:111:81-83).
This is paralleled by his anthropology in which he lists three types of 
man: ea rth -bo rn , heaven-born and God-born.
The ea rth -bo rn  are those who take the pleasures of the body fo r 
th e ir q u a rry , who make it th e ir  practice to indulge in them and 
enjoy them and provide the means by which each of them may be 
promoted. The heaven-born are the votaries of the arts  and of 
knowledge, the lovers of learning. For the heavenly element in 
us is the mind, as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind. 
And it  is the mind which pursues the learning of the schools and
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the other arts one and all, which sharpens and whets itse lf, aye, 
and tra ins and d r ills  itse lf solid in the contemplation of what is 
in te llig ib le  by mind. But the men of God are priests and prophets 
who have refused to accept membership in the commonwealth of the 
world and to become citizens there in , bu t have risen wholly above 
the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated in to the 
world of the in te llig ib le  and dwell there registered as freemen of 
the commonwealth of Ideas, which are imperishable and incorporeal 
(Philo, 1968:11:GO-61).
He describes the reconciliation between the soul and God in two ways: 
God's descent into the human soul and the soul's ascent to God:
In both, the in terp lay of transcendence and immanence in the 
concept of God is of decisive importance. God the exalted, superior 
to every thinkable human category, comes to merge w ith the human 
soul, o r the soul surpasses even the summit of Plato's ideal heaven
- th is  is what happens in the un ity  between God and man 
(Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11 -.414).
This concept is closer to the world of mysticism than to the ethical re li­
gion of Judaism, "in  line w ith Philo's preference of immediate in tu ition  
over and above the rational knowledge of God" (Guttmann, 1973:30).
Like Philo, Saadia sees man as a composite of body and soul, crcated 
together:
Our Lord, blessed and exalted be He, has informed us tha t man's 
soul has its o rig in  in his heart simultaneously w ith the completion 
of the formation of his body (Saadia, 1958:235).
He views the soul as being composed of very fine material and having 
three essential facu lties: appetite, which controls growth and reprod­
uction; s p ir it ,  o r courage, which controls the emotions; and reason, 
which controls knowledge. This, as Katz (1975:125) notes, is the famous 
tr ip a r t ite  Platonic account of man which Saadia took over from Islamic 
Platonism. It  is because of th is tha t the Hebrew language has three
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d iffe re n t names fo r the soul: nefesh, ruah and neshamah, which re fer 
respective ly to the three faculties (c f. Saadia, 1948:244).
Saadia maintains tha t the soul cannot act on its own and, as a resu lt, 
is placed in the body which serves as its  instrum ent. He adds:
Now it is a mistake to apportion these (th ree) faculties among two 
d is tin c t (psych ic) elements, one of which has its seat in the heart 
while the other is located in the rest of the body. A ll three powers 
belong rather to one soul, to emphasize which fact the language 
of S crip tu re  has coined two additional designations, besides those 
prev iously listed; namely, hayyah ( liv in g ) and yehidhad (un ique).
It is called hayyah (e .g . Job 33:20) because of its capacity to 
su rv ive  when its Creator grants it  su rv iva l. I t  is also yehidhah 
(e .g . Ps. 22:21) because there exists nothing comparable to it  
among all creaturcs, e ither celestial o r te rre s tr ia l (Saadia, 
1948:144)
By his actions, which implies the performance of the d ivine 
commandments, man can reach true  happiness; and any reward comes 
through actions fo r which man himself is responsible. Therefore, the 
correct way of life  is tha t which resu lts in the satisfaction of man's needs 
and in the development of his powers. As Guttmann (1973:80) says, "the 
in junction to live a happy life , and the ethics of commandment and d u ty , 
stand side by side w ithout any attempt at reconcilia tion ."
S im ilarly, Philo expresses the goal of the ethical life  in terms of s tr iv in g  
fo r  happiness. I t  is th is which is the highest good and the most f it t in g  
object of desire and hope fo r the philosophically oriented person. In 
agreement w ith Greek philosophers, especially Plato and A ris to tle , Philo 
sees happiness as the product of two types of v ir tu e : an inte llectual 
v ir tu e , which he calls wisdom, and a moral v ir tu e , which he calls p ru ­
dence. "Whereas wisdom or in te llectual v ir tu e  can be taught, prudence 
o r moral v ir tu e  is the f r u it ,  not of teaching, but of habitual practice" 
(B lau, 1971:60).
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The notion of frep -w ill is a problem in both th e ir philosophies as if  man 
is not free he cannot be held responsible fo r his actions; if he is free, 
then God cannot be omnipotent and possibly not omniscient e ither.
In The unchangeableness of God, Philo contends that man is free, can 
make vo lun tary choices, is able to know good from ev il, and can act ac­
cord ing ly . Therefore, he "is w ith reason blamed fo r what he does wrong 
w ith in ten t, praised when he acts r ig h tly  of his own w ill" (Philo, 
1968:111:33-35). Paradoxically, however, Philo stresses tha t w ithout the 
help of God, man cannot do good by his own power; in the face of re ­
ligious experience, he is impotent before God (c f. Guttmann, 1973:29).
Saadia also appears to be unable to resolve th is question. In contrast 
w ith the Islamic doctrine of predestination, he asserts tha t man must have 
freedom of choice as he is responsible fo r his actions, and if he did not 
have th is freedom it  would be un just fo r God to reward or punish him 
(c f. Saadia, 1948:187). In attempting to reconcile the paradox of free 
choice w ith God’s foreknowledge, Saadia says that God's knowledge does 
not cause man's actions and, thus, does not curb his freedom of choice:
. . .  let me say . . . tha t the Creator, magnified be His majesty, does 
not in any way in te rfe re  w ith the actions of men and tha t He does 
not exercise any force upon them e ither to obey o r disobey Him 
(Saadia, 1948:188).
God simply knows what the resu lt of man's deliberation w ill be and does 
not t r y  to influence him. The question is, however: if  God knows what 
man w ill do, is th is  not in itse lf predestination and a contradiction of 
Saadia's stated opinion?
3.5 Knowledge
Philo describes various modes of knowledge man can employ in ap­
proaching an understanding of God. The f ir s t  is inte llectual knowledge 
which comes from nature and tra in ing  and is an emanation form the Logos; 
w ith th is  knowledge, man can s tr ive  to link  himself to God. Secondly, 
there is empirical knowledge which is ju s t a preparation fo r  the knowledge 
of God, having no value of its own. T h ird ly , as Philo uses science ex-
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clusive ly fo r religious purposes, philosophic and religious knowledge 
become one. Furtherm ore, there is immediate in tu ition  which, having 
no sc ientific  basis, is a repudiation of all theoretical knowledge. F inally, 
Philo lauds the mystical knowledge of God, contrad ic ting his earlie r praise 
of sc ien tific  enqu iry  (c f. Guttman, 1973:30).
Not adhering to Philo's c lassification, Saadia identifies three sources of 
knowledge: sense perception; se lf-evident princ ip les, such as the ap­
proval of te lling  the tru th  and the condemnation of ly in g ; in ferentia l 
knowledge gained by sy llog is tic  reasoning - in other words, rational 
conclusions from the data provided by sense and reason (c f. Saadia, 
1948:16). To these, however, he adds a fo u rth : tha t of a reliable 
trad ition , confidence in the tru th  of the reports of others, which is es­
sential in the function ing  of society (c f. Saadia, 1948:19). As the
F.ncyclopaedia Judaica (1971:X IV :549) points out: " In  Judaism reliable 
trad ition  has special significance in tha t it refers to the transmission, 
th rough S crip tu re  and the oral trad ition , of God's revelation to the 
p ro ph e ts .”
It is th is concept of revelation to which both philosophers pay a degree 
of atten tion.
3.6 Revelation
In his w ritings , Philo insists tha t reason alone cannot guide man to an 
adequate and true  knowledge of God. To achieve th is , "reason must be 
aided by revelation, by which Philo meant the record of Sinai as set down 
in the B ib le” (S ilve r, 1974:211). It is, there fore, evident that Philo 
is in accord w ith the Jewish concept of revelation in regard ing the Torah 
as the absolute vehicle of God's tru th ; revelation c la rifies , in a way that 
reason cannot, aspects of God, creation and im m ortality.
I t  appears that Saadia goes more deeply into th is question by maintaining 
that although knowledge of the tru th  can be a rrived  at through specu­
la tion, revelation is necessary in o rder to transm it the tru th  to those 
not able to investigate ra tiona lly ; furtherm ore, even if one is able to 
consider ra tiona lly , the doctrines contained in the Bible must not be ig ­
nored. However, he adds the rid e r that there is a correspondence be-
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tween reason and revelation, and onw cannot re fu te the other. As a 
resu lt, "one must reject the v a lid ity  of any prophet whose teachings 
contrad ict reason, even if  he accompanies his teachings w ith miracles" 
(Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971 :X IV :5 5 0 ). Saadis holds tha t revelation is 
necessary fo r  man to gain knowledge of the trad itiona l laws, and also for 
him to a rrive  at a knowledge of rational laws, as reason deals only w ith 
abstract princip les and general norms.
3.7 Prophecy
Following from the concept of revelation is the one of prophecy, and once 
more Philo and Saadia are at variance in some respects while agreeing in 
others. In his treatise On the special laws, Philo propounds that "no 
pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an in te rp re te r 
prompted by Another in all his utterances, 'Another' being the 'D ivine 
S p ir it '"  (Philo, 1968; VI11:37). This is in accord w ith Saadia's s ixth  
p rinc ip le  in th is  Book of beliefs and opinions that a Jew must believe that 
the prophets were sent by God to communicate His message to men, God 
having appointed the prophets to call s in fu l man to repentance" (c f. 
Cahn, 1962:332).
. . .  I pondered the m atter deeply and I found tha t there was con­
siderable need fo r the dispatch of messengers to God's creatures, 
not merely in o rder tha t they m ight be informed by them about the 
revealed laws, but also on account of the rational precepts. For 
these la tte r, too, are carried out p ractica lly  on ly when there are 
messengers to in s tru c t men concerning them (Saadia, 1948:145).
However, in his esoteric w ritings , Philo abandons th is concept of 
prophecy being a mission to the people:
Here prophecy is an act of ecstasy, where man is overflooded w ith 
d iv ine  lig h t. No perceptible message is connected w ith th is  expe­
rience, fo r in its consumation "ears are made into eyes" . . .  and 
the message vanishes into flashes of lig h t. (Encyclopaedia 
Judaica, 1971 ;XI 11:415)
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This possibly unorthodox approach can also be found in Philo's allegorical 
in te rpre ta tion  of parts of the Bible.
3 .8 Allegorization
By means of the allegorical method, Philo puts forward a philosophical 
re in le rp re ta tion  of both the historical and the legal parts of the 
Pentateuch. He is not innovative as such w ith regard to the allegorical 
method, th is procedure having been introduced by pre-p la ton ic philoso­
phers, developed by the stoics and then employed by A lexandrine Jews 
before Philo. Earlier Jewish expositors used allegory, as Philo does, to 
counteract the mockery of rationalists and to b ring  the Jewish religion 
into line w ith Hellenistic though t. (C f. Lewy, in Three Jewish philoso­
phers, 1969:13.) Moreover, Philo aims at b ring ing  together the two forms 
of tru th  through th is  method: human knowledge and divine revelation. 
He examines the Torah, pa rticu la rly  Genesis, "as the subject of a sus­
tained allegory in which the soul burdened w ith the confusions of life  
sets out on a sp iritua l journey tha t, if properly  managed, w ill perm it it 
to gain tru th  and im m orta lity" (S ilve r, 1974:213). Both the patriarchs 
and the matriarchs appear as nomoi empsychoi ("fleshed out tru th s ")  
whose lives reveal the basic tru th s  about man, man's nature and God. 
Furtherm ore, w ith rpgard to the anthropomorphization of God, Philo 
adopts an allegorical approach: His hands, eyes, limbs and moods that 
are re ferred to should not be taken lite ra lly  but regarded as metaphors. 
For instance, when the Torah speaks of God's eyes, it does not mean that 
He possesses the physical organs of v is ion, but tha t He knows what oc­
curs. 1 his is all ve ry  well, but the mere reference to His "know ing" is 
also an anthropomorphization and does not really solve the problem. Philo 
stresses symbolic import bu t, as Bamberger (1970:90) points out, a l­
though many such explanations might be accurate, o ther "sophisticated 
in te rpre ta tions . . .  would have puzzled the orig ina l a u th o r."
Saadia follows the same general method as Philo in exp la in ing away the 
theological d ifficu ltie s  of certain B iblical tex ts . Bib lical statements that 
seemingly con trad ict ra tiona lity  (such as Jacob's ladder reaching to 
heaven) and anthropomorphic descriptions of God must be considered as 
allegories. In o rder to rid  the anthropomorphic terms o r descriptions 
of th e ir trad itiona l meaning, Saadia f ir s t  "neutra lizes" them by showing
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tha t they are applied in the Bible to man as well, where they also cannot 
be taken lite ra lly ; then he deduces a fo r t io r i the im possib ility of the ir 
lite ra l application to God. Rawidowicz (197-1:256) summarizes Saadia's 
reasoning in saying:
If thus head related in the Bible sometimes to man expresses ele­
vation, eye supervision, face pleasantness o r anger, ear 
acceptence, mouth and lip commanding, hand potence, heart w is­
dom, bowels am iability, leg coercion - how much more these terms 
must convey all those non-bodily meanings when related to God.
3.9 Reward and punishment, and immortality
Another concern of both philosophers is tha t of theodicy, and they con­
sider why the evil prosper and the good su ffe r. Philo insists that the 
judgements of men and God are not alike:
Tor we inqu ire  into what is manifest but He penetrates noiselessly 
into the recesses of the soul, sees our thoughts as though in b rig h t 
sun ligh t, and s tripp in g  o ff the wrappings in which they are en­
veloped, inspects our motives in th e ir naked rea lity  and at once 
distinguishes the counterfe it from the genuine (Philo, 1967:
IX :483).
He contends tha t God knows who have impious and ruthless souls and 
treats them as capital offenders, stressing tha t none of the wicked really 
has happiness, "and th is is a very  strong proof tha t providence exists" 
(Philo, 1967: tX :487).
In similar vein, Saadia finds the solution as ly ing  in the balance between 
su ffe ring  in th is  world and being rewarded in the next, in the world to 
come. Therefore, he believes in the immortality of the soul, and also in 
the resurrection of the dead (c f. Saadia, 1948:279).
4. CONCLUSION
Philo and Saadia both agree and disagree concerning certain salient 
philosophical concepts. This is understandsble in the ligh t of the in -
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fluences on them. A part from the obvious Jewish background w ith  its 
de fin ite  and, at times, unique approach where they had much in common, 
they moved in to ta lly  d iffe re n t in te llectual spheres: Philo, w ith Hellenism 
predom inating, and Saadia w ith the M u'tazilites as sign ificant.
Both see God as omniscient and omnipotent, but Philo's God, unlike 
Saadia’s, is not a personal one; his Logos f ills  the gap here. They d iffe r  
on the theory of creation, Philo stressing tha t the world was created 
beyond the confines of time and out of p re -ex is ten t matter, and Saadia 
asserting that it  was created ex n ih ilo  in time.
Both consider man as a dua lity  of body and soul, and agree that the goal 
of the ethical life  is to attain happiness, which is the highest good. They 
pay attention to knowledge, but c lassify it d iffe re n tly , and Saadia's ex­
planation of revelation is ev idently  given deeper consideration than that 
of Philo. On the other hand, Philo has a more complex view of prophecy 
in not always regard ing it  as a mission to the people.
Philo and Saadia both explain various aspects of the Bible as allegorical, 
and discard any attempt to anthropomorphize God physica lly, bu t con­
trad ic t themselves when it  comes to the more ethnical, cognitive o r even 
emotional matters. F ina lly, both believe in man's freedom of choice but 
cannot really reconcile it  to God's omniscience o r omnipotence satisfac­
to r ily .
Nevertheless, as Guttman (1973:32) points ou t, Philo was the f ir s t  to 
attempt to unite human knowledge and d iv ine revelation and can le g it­
imately be called "the f ir s t  theologian". Saadia was equally im portant in 
his being the f ir s t  medieval Jewish philosopher to endeavour to reconcile 
the Bible and philosophy, revelation and reason (c f. Encyclopaedia 
Judaica, 1971:X IV : D49). In th is  they are sim ilar - and in th is the ir 
greatness lies.
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